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GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, FOOD SAFETY, AND SUSTAINABILITY 
  
Challenges and Opportunities 
 
 
David A. Wirth* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the legal and policy relationship reinforcement amongst 
international standards for GIs, food safety standards, and other claims of quality or 
safety. The paper addresses those relationships within the context of international trade 
agreements protecting GIs, such as the 1994 TRIPS Agreement, the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the chapter  on intellectual 
property and geographical indications in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) currently under negotiation.  Trade agreements also discipline food 
safety measures and non-GI indications of quality or safety such as “organic” and 
“GMO-free.”  Accordingly, the paper also considers the extent to which international 
trade agreements such as the WTO Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) might 
interact with the analysis. 
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acknowledges the helpful comments and advice from Sherry Xin Chen, Justin Hughes, and Joan Shear.  
The responsibility for all views expressed in this paper is nonetheless the author's own.  Portions of this 
paper are based on the author's previously published writings. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Reports over the past few years of widespread contamination in French wines,1 
and prosecution of organic wine producers from Bourgogne for failure to use pesticides,2 
have highlighted the previously under-appreciated potential for conflicting messages or 
even outright conflicts amongst various regulatory schemes for foodstuffs.  These 
include: 
 
 Geographical indications (GIs); 
 
 Substantive food safety standards; and 
 
 Non-GI label indications of quality, safety, or sustainability such as “organic,” 
“GMO-free,” and “sustainably produced.” 
 
Although perhaps always latent in the multiplicity of arrangements for 
communicating information about foodstuffs, this paper attempts to: 
 
 Identify the varying purposes of these schemes; 
 
 Identify the various sources of policy and law that apply to them; and 
 
 Compare their treatment in various contexts, including TTIP and other free trade 
agreements. 
 
This paper consequently examines the potential for conflict or reinforcement 
amongst GIs, food safety standards, and other claims of quality or safety. These claims of 
food safety and quality share a common feature in that they are transmitted to consumers 
through labels on the packaging of the product itself, and consequently are 
representations by the manufacture or processor paper as to the identity, safety, or quality 
of that product.  They differ, however, in their underlying policy aims.  And they vary 
greatly in the sources of international law and policy that govern their treatment, 
including but not limited to international trade. 
 
                                                 
 1.  “Des pesticides dans les vins,” Que Choisir (Oct. 2013) (reporting on study of French wines 
conducted by Excell enology laboratory); “Lab Tests on French Wines Find Pesticide Residue in Every 
Bottle,” Food Safety News, Sept. 30, 2013 (reporting that even organic wine contained pesticide residues), 
<http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/09/lab-tests-on-french-wines-find-pesticide-residue-in-every-
bottle/#.VRbGefzF8rU>. 
 
 2.  “French organic winegrower fined for refusing to spray grapes with pesticide,” The Guardian, 
Apr. 7, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/07/french-organic-winegrower-fined-refusing-
spray-grapes-pesticide>; “Pesticides in French Wine,” New York Times, Jan. 2, 2014 (noting that 
“[o]rganic wine producers in the Burgundy region of France are facing prosecution for refusing to use 
pesticides.”), <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/03/opinion/pesticides-in-french-wine.html>. 
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Amongst other things, the paper will address those relationships within the 
context of international trade agreements protecting GIs, such as the 1994 TRIPS 
Agreement, the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
and the chapter  on intellectual property and geographical indications in the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently under negotiation. 
 
Trade agreements also discipline food safety measures and, potentially, non-GI 
indications of quality or safety such as “organic” and “GMO-free.”  Accordingly, the 
paper considers the extent to which free trade agreements such as the WTO Agreements 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement) and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) might interact with the analysis.   
 
Accordingly, the paper first identifies sources of law and policy related to each of 
these three categories of indications of food safety and quality.  The paper then examines 
the relationship amongst these three categories of attributes from the point of view of the 
interactions amongst the various sources of law and policy.  Last, the paper makes 
recommendations for reconciling these disparate sources of law and policy, as well as 
policy goals, in the context of free trade agreements such as TTIP. 
 
 
II. International Protections for Geographic Indications  
 
As is well-known, designations of origin and geographical indications 
(collectively “GIs”) have been protected at the European Union level since 1992,3 as 
updated through 2012.4  At present, any number of wines, beers, spirits, cheeses, and 
processed meats are protected at the European level, including Cognac, Roquefort cheese, 
Sherry, Parmigiano Reggiano, Teruel and Parma hams, and Tuscany olives.5 
 
According to the EU, “[t]he protection of geographical indications matters 
economically and culturally. They can create value for local communities through 
products that are deeply rooted in tradition, culture and geography. They support rural 
development and promote new job opportunities in production, processing and other 
related services.”6  Conversely, “geographical names with commercial value are exposed 
to misuse and counterfeiting. The abuse of geographical indications limits access to 
certain markets and undermines consumer loyalty. Fraudulent use of geographical 
                                                 
 3.  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 35 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 
208) 1 (1992).   
 
 4.  Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 21 November 
2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 58 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 343) 1 
(2012).   
 
 5 .  Geographical-indications, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-
property/geographical-indications/>. 
 
 6.  Id. 
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indications hurts both producers and consumers.”7 
 
An alternative view is that protection of GIs by countries in which they originate 
operate as trade barriers.  A letter from 50 U.S. Senators, expressing concern for 
American agricultural interests, sums up this position: 
 
In country after country, the EU has been using its free trade agreements (FTAs) 
to persuade its trading partners to impose barriers to U.S. exports under the guise of 
protection for its geographical indications. . . .  
 
Reportedly, the EU now seeks to more directly impair U.S. competition by 
imposing restrictions on the use of common food names through TTIP. In the states that 
we represent, many small or medium-sized family owned farms and firms could have 
their business unfairly restricted by the EU's push to use geographical indications as a 
barrier to dairy trade and competition. As we begin to engage in TTIP negotiations that 
are ultimately intended to bring about a better economic climate on both sides of the 
Atlantic by lowering barriers to trade, we strongly oppose the EU's gratuitous use of GIs 
as a protectionist measure.
8
   
 
Trade disputes over non-tariff barriers frequently arise from differences in 
national regulatory approaches,9 as in the protection of GIs.  The EU and the United 
States protect names of origin in different ways.  EU law protects “geographical 
indications,” while U.S. law allows producers to protect these names as trademarks.  
Nonetheless, many EU GIs are not protected in the United States, and may not be 
registrable as trademarks because of their widespread generic use. 
 
This means that products can be sold in the United States which use GIs protected 
in Europe, but which were not produced in that region.  For example, although the GI 
“Parmigiano Reggiano” is registered under the EU system, “Parmesan” cheese produced 
in the United States is regularly sold there under that name.10  According to one view, this 
situation may mislead consumers in the United States.  According to the other, the 
exclusionary use of a term such as “Parmesan” is a protectionist measure that 
disadvantages potential competitors, to the detriment of consumers as well. 
 
                                                 
 7.  Id. 
 
 8.  Letter from 50 U..S. Senators to Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture and Michael Froman, 
United States Trade Representative (Mar. 11, 2014), 
<http://www.baldwin.senate.gov/download/?id=e79c53e4-5bc9-4162-b20c-bdeb4a5d21cf&download=1>. 
 
 9.  See David A. Wirth, The World Trade Organization Dispute Over Genetically Modified 
Organisms: The Precautionary Principle Meets International Trade Law, 37 Vermont L. Rev. 1153, 1163 
(2013). 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Larry Olmstead, Most Parmesan Cheeses In America Are Fake, Here's Why, Forbes, 
Nov. 19, 2012 (noting that Kraft was prohibited from selling its Parmesan cheese on European markets) , 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/larryolmsted/2012/11/19/the-dark-side-of-parmesan-cheese-what-you-dont-
know-might-hurt-you/>. 
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Although other organizations such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) have established international legal standards with respect to GIs,11 
the most important legal context for addressing GIs have been trade agreements, chief 
amongst them the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS).12  With the collapse of the WTO’s 
Doha Agenda, the TRIPS Agreement is the sole potentially global trade authority 
establishing rules for GIs, and pending the adoption of the TTIP, the only one governing 
EU-U.S. trade. 
 
The theory of the TRIPS Agreement is unique amongst WTO agreements, in that 
it establishes affirmative obligations for members to enact identified legal protections for 
intellectual property, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  This approach in effect 
reifies intellectual property, such as creative products like motion pictures, by creating 
goods that can be identified as such in international trade.  Other provisions in trade 
agreements are typically “negative,” in that they constrain governmental behavior.13 
 
The TRIPS Agreement treats GIs as a form of intellectual property requiring 
affirmative governmental protection and mutual recognition in international trade.  
Article 22 applies to all goods, and provides a standard level of protection.  Article 23 
provides enhanced protection to GIs related to wines and spirits.  Article 24 provides for 
exceptions, as for products where the indication of origin has become generic, or has 
already been registered as a trademark. 
 
The Doha mandate identified two agenda items, both of which would have 
resulted in enhanced protections for GIs:  (1) the creation of a multilateral register for 
wines and spirits; and (2) extension of the higher level of protection found in article 23 
beyond wines and spirits to such products as cheeses and dried meats, both of which are 
now covered only by the generic provisions of article 22.14  GI protections in the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)15 provide a higher level 
                                                 
 11.  E.g., Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International 
Registration, October 31, 1958, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967,  
and as amended on September 28, 1979, 923 U.N.T.S. 189.  A diplomatic conference is scheduled in May 
for the adoption of a new Act of the Lisbon Agreement.  See 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/diplomatic_conferences/2015/en/> (WIPO announcement of diplomatic 
conference). 
 
12 . Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 
 13.  See Wirth, supra note 9, at 1161-62. 
 
 14.  Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 18  (Nov. 20, 2001), 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>.  Even before the Doha 
Agenda, article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement called for the TRIPS Council to establish multilateral system 
of notification and registration of geographical indications. 
 
 15 .  Published Sept. 26, 2014, ch. 22, art. 7, 
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of protection to a wider array of products, including cheeses and dried meats, than does 
TRIPS. 
 
Although as of this writing the negotiating text of the TTIP is not public, and the 
EU has not released its negotiating text for this portion of the agreement, it is probably 
safe to assume that in the TTIP negotiations the EU is seeking further protections for GIs 
and that the United States is likely to oppose that agenda.  According to the official EU 
fact sheet on the subject, “We want the US to improve its system in several important 
ways. These include: protecting an agreed list of EU GIs, with rules to stop other 
producers misusing them; [and] enforcing those rules effectively.”16 
 
 
III. International Standards for Food Safety 
 
International efforts to address food safety generally fall into one of two 
categories:  (1) affirmative (“positive”) efforts to establish minimum standards; and (2) 
the establishment of trade-based (“negative”) disciplines designed to prevent abuse.   
 
A. Harmonized International Food Safety Standards 
 
In contrast to intellectual property rights, including GIs, affirmative international 
undertakings to assure food safety are generally non-binding or hortatory in nature.  One 
such effort, Codex Alimentarius, has been undertaken in the context of existing 
multilateral, government-to-government negotiations, representing the highest level of 
governmental involvement.  Another major forum, the International Organization for 
Standardization is something of a hybrid, with mixed business and governmental inputs, 
with the relative proportions of both varying from country to country.  Others are purely 
private voluntary standards, ranging in coverage from potentially global consortia to 
individual firms such as importers and retailers. 
  
  1. Codex Alimentarius 
 
Codex Alimentarius is an international standard-setting body whose members are 
states.  The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1962 as a joint undertaking 
of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO).  The Commission, membership in which is open to all FAO and WHO member 
states and now numbers 185, has a dual function:  "protecting the health of the [sic] 
consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade."17  To this end, the Commission 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf> 
 
 16 .  Intellectual property rights (IPR) and geographical indications (GIs) in TTIP, 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153020.7%20IPR,%20GIs%202.pdf>. 
 
17 .  Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, art. 1, para. a, reprinted in Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual 4 (23d  ed. 2015), 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_23e.pdf>.  
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is specifically charged with adopting advisory multilateral "good practice" standards on 
such matters as the composition of food products, food additives, labelling, food 
processing techniques, and inspection of foodstuffs and processing facilities.  In the food 
safety area, as of 2006, in the form of non-binding standards, guidelines, and codes of 
practice, Codex had evaluated 218 pesticides, establishing 2,930 maximum residue 
limitations, and published 1,112 food additive provisions for 292 substances.18   
 
Codex standards are primarily intended as hortatory guidance to governments in 
the establishment of their own national regulations.  Although it performs a variety of 
functions and reaches a range of constituencies, Codex tends to be an institutional setting 
to which developing countries with less rather than more regulatory infrastructure can 
look in establishing national requirements.  More specifically, developing country 
agricultural exporters, typically small and without much political leverage, can also look 
to Codex for assistance in creating export markets.   
 
  2. ISO 22000 
 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), created immediately 
after World War II with headquarters in Geneva, is an international federation of 
standardizing bodies from 163 countries. ISO is not an intergovernmental organization, 
such as the United Nations, constituted by multilateral agreement whose members are 
states represented by governmental authorities. Although the ISO member from some 
countries is a governmental entity such as a national standardizing body, ISO is primarily 
a forum for coordinating standardizing efforts by private business. The U.S. member of 
ISO is the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private entity. For the United 
States, the primary, although not sole, participants in ISO processes are representatives of 
private industry. 
  
ISO’s principal work product consists of voluntary standards adopted by 
consensus. In contrast to some of the output of intergovernmental organizations, ISO 
standards are strictly hortatory and are not binding under international law. ISO standards 
are both adopted by and addressed to private parties.  ISO has adopted its 22000 series of 
standards on food safety, which are “auditable” or subject to verification by appropriately 
accredited private, third-party auditors or certifiers (inspectors in this context), for which 
there is an elaborate system already in place.  ISO’s 17000 series establishes standards 
for “conformity assessment,”  which includes such activities as testing and inspection. 
 
  3. Global Food Safety Initiative 
 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) is an industry-initiated effort 
commenced in 2000 after a number of food safety scares, organized as a Belgian non-
profit.  The original members were eight major retailers:  Carrefour, Tesco, ICA, Metro, 
Migros, Ahold, Wal-Mart and Delhaize.  Others that have since joined include Cargill, 
                                                 
 18 .  Understanding Codex Alimentarius 11 (3d ed. 2006), 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/Understanding_EN.pdf >. 
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Coca Cola, Starbucks, and McDonald’s, although the latter has recently withdrawn.  
Originally European in its focus, GFSI subsequently became increasingly accepted in the 
United States, to the point that it is now arguably the principal scheme for coordinated 
industry action on voluntary food safety standards in North America. 
 
GFSI responded to a concern that many of the larger food suppliers and retailers 
were simultaneously complying with, and being audited by reference to, a variety of 
private voluntary food safety standards.  Instead of attempting to harmonize these 
standards or “schemes,” GFSI “benchmarks” existing food safety schemes.  
“Benchmarking” is “the method by which a food safety scheme is compared to defined 
[GFSI] requirements . . . to determine equivalence. 19   Currently there are four 
benchmarked (i.e., determined by GFSI to be equivalent) private voluntary schemes:  (1)) 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global Standard for Food Safety;20 (2) Dutch HACCP;21 
(3) International Featured Standards (IFS) for Food;22 and (4) Safe Quality Food (SQF) 
Standards. 
 
GFSI has a defined internal governance system addressing the roles of 
participating industry members.  One of GFSI’s principal missions is to reduce costs by 
minimizing duplication of audits, as suggested by its slogan “once certified, accepted 
everywhere.”  GFSI does not itself perform any audits or certifications, but it has adopted 
and enhanced the requirements of ISO standards as a model for audits of GFSI 
standards.23 
 
4. Other Voluntary Food Safety Standards 
 
In addition to the four GFSI-benchmarked schemes, there are a variety of other 
sets of private, voluntary food safety standards.  One important one is Global GAP, 
roughly an analogue of GFSI, although with many more members, both 
                                                 
 19 .  Global Food Safety Initiative, GFSI Guidance Document, 
<http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/Guidance_Document_Sixth_Edition_Version_6.1.pdf>.  The Guidance 
Document sets out detailed standards for the benchmarking process.  
  
 20.  See <http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/standards/food > . 
  
 21 ,  See <http://www.foodsafetymanagement.info/net-
book.php?op=cms&nnl=english&pageid=61&pageid_up=0 > 
  
 22 . See < http://www.ifs-
certification.com/index.php?page=home&content=public_content&desc=ifs_standards_food_5&language=
english>. 
  
23.  These include ISO Guide 65 (general requirements for bodies operating product certification 
systems); ISO 17021 (conformity assessment – requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of 
management systems); ISO 17000 (conformity assessment – vocabulary and general principles); and ISO 
17011 (conformity assessment - general requirements for accreditation bodies accrediting conformity 
assessment bodies). 
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producers/suppliers and retailers. 24   Additionally, various industry sectors have 
undertaken to establish private voluntary standards.  For example the American Spice 
Trade Association has developed its own guidance.25  There has recently been concern 
voiced about the capacity of private voluntary standards established by industry consortia 
to operate as trade barriers, in effect constricting market access for agricultural exporters 
in developing countries.26  
 
B. Trade-Based Disciplines on Food Safety Standards 
 
The treatment of food safety in international trade agreements is designed to 
discipline otherwise non-discriminatory measures to prevent their abuse as non-tariff 
barriers to trade.  The negotiation of the Uruguay Round of Trade Agreements in GATT 
coincided with a long-running conflict between the United States and the EU over the 
EU’s prohibition of the sale of meat and meat products treated for growth promotion with 
any of three synthetic or three natural hormones.  The United States, where use of the 
same hormones is permitted for these purposes, for more than a decade objected to the 
EU hormone ban as a non-tariff barrier to trade unsupported by scientific evidence.  
Because of concerns such as these, a new Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards27 (SPS Agreement) was adopted in 1994 as part of the package 
of instruments creating the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
The SPS Agreement governs measures applied to protect the life or health of 
humans, animals, or plants from pests, disease-causing organisms, additives, 
contaminants, and toxins. Consequently, the agreement disciplines or governs both food 
safety measures and agricultural quarantines. An SPS measure that is based on 
international standards, where they exist – in the case of food safety standards, as 
identified in the Codex Alimentarius – is entitled to a presumption of validity (Article 
3.1).  If an international standard does not meet a member’s nationally-determined 
“appropriate level of protection,” and the member’s food safety measure is therefore 
more rigorous than the international standard, then the measure must be justified by 
reference to a series of science-based tests. 
 
In particular, such a measure must be supported by “a scientific justification” 
                                                 
 24.  See <http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2>. 
 
 25.  American Spice Trade Association, Clean, Safe Spices:  Guidance from the American Spice 
Trade Association, <http://www.astaspice.org/files/members/ASTAGuidance.pdf>. 
  
 26.  See, e.g., WTO Doc. G/SPS/R/62 paras 132-146 (May 27, 1011) (report of WTO Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures expressing concern about private and commercial standards for 
food).  See also Members take first steps on private standards in food safety, animal-plant health (WTO 
News, Mar. 30 & 31, 2011), <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm>.   
   
 27.  World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
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(Article 3.3). A challenged measure must be “based on scientific principles” (Article 2.2), 
must not be “maintained without sufficient scientific evidence” (Article 2.2), and the 
regulatory process leading to the measure must “take into account available scientific 
evidence” (Article 5.2). A central feature of the SPS Agreement, found in Article 5.1, is a 
requirement for a risk assessment, and the principal operative test in the agreement is the 
need for the measure to be “based on” that risk assessment.  The SPS Agreement 
consequently codifies requirements for an approach to regulation roughly commensurate 
with a risk assessment/risk management duality, which confines scientific questions to 
the risk assessment stage.  The choice and design of a measure designed to prevent or 
ameliorate actual or potential harms is frequently identified as “risk management.” 
 
Not surprisingly, the first dispute under the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement was 
initiated by the United States and Canada against the EU over hormone-treated beef,
28
 
which became one of the longest-running disputes in WTO history because of the EU’s 
refusal to remove the measure.  Another important dispute concerned the EU’s treatment 
of genetically modified foods and crops.
29
  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)30 and other regional and bilateral trade agreements to which the United States 
is party31 contain provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as does CETA.32 
 
The TTIP negotiations include a portion on sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  
According to the EU’s official fact sheet33 and its proposed negotiating text,34 the EU 
does not appear to anticipate new substantive disciplines for food safety measures.  
Indeed, the fact sheet states that standards for food safety, GMOs, and animal welfare 
will not be relaxed.  The EU proposal seems to be more focused on streamlining the 
process for entry of EU agricultural exports into the U.S., particularly as the United 
States implements new food safety legislation.35  The U.S. for its part appears to be 
                                                 
 28.  European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
 
 29 .  European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DR293/R (Sept. 29, 2006).  See Wirth, supra note 9. 
 
 30.  North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14 & 17, 1992, United States-Canada-
Mexico, ch. 7, 32 I.L.M. 296, 612 (1993) (sanitary and phytosanitary measures).   
 
 31.  See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, ch. 6 
(sanitary and phytosanitary measures), < https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-
dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text>. 
 
 32.  Supra note 15, ch. 7. 
 
 33 . 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153004.3%20Food%20safety,%20a+p%20healt
h%20(SPS).pdf>. 
 
 34.  <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file893_3923.pdf>. 
 
 35.  FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2010). 
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seeking enhanced substantive disciplines on food safety measures.36 
 
 
IV. Other International Standards for Labeling of Food 
 
In contrast to GIs and food safety standards, many of which have been in place for 
some time, foodstuffs are now voluntarily labeled for any number of other attributes, 
including: 
 
 Organically produced; 
 
 Sustainably produced; 
 
 Natural or all-natural; 
 
 GMO-free; 
 
 Antibiotic-free; 
 
 Hormone-free or no hormones added;  
 
 Free-range or cage-free; 
 
 Grass-fed or pasture-raised; and 
 
 Humane raised and/or handled. 
 
Some consumers also seem to be particularly interested in purchasing locally-
produced food, lending greater importance to non-GI indications of the locality of origin.  
Such claims or labels are specific to foodstuffs, but there are many others for non-food 
articles in commerce, including those awarded by private voluntary certifying 
organizations.  Examples include fair trade coffee and sustainably harvested timber.  
Although the EU has mandatory standards for animal welfare, there are no comparable 
governmentally-established standards in the United States.  Certified Humane,37a private 
organization, has established standards for humane treatment, along with requirements 
for meeting its standards for “free range” and “pasture raised.” 
  
                                                 
 36.  Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits In the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Detailed View, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-Detailed-View>. 
 
 37.  <http://certifiedhumane.org/>. 
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 A. Codex Alimentarius Harmonized Standards for Food Labelling 
 
 Because of the proliferation in the range of claims that have been made with 
respect to an attribute of a foodstuff or the process by which it has been produced, the 
coverage of international standards is less than complete.  Moreover, the source of labels 
can vary greatly, from unilateral claims that are basically advertising to governmentally-
mandated requirements.   
 
 Although not directly applicable to food, ISO has developed a generally-accepted 
approach to categorizing labels.  Unilateral claims made by manufactures are known as 
“type II” labels. 38  “Type I” labels address governmentally- or privately-established 
schemes that include a single mark, such as the EU ecolabel for identifying products and 
services that have a reduced environmental impact throughout their life cycle or the U.S. 
Energy Star logo for identifying energy-efficient personal computers.39 Both of these 
schemes are voluntary, with the standards for awarding the label established by a 
governmental authority.  Type III labels40 transmit disaggregated quantified information 
in a manner similar to the identification of fat, carbohydrates, and protein on nutrition 
labels in the United States and other countries. 
 
 Although labeling for many of the quality attributes identified above are regulated 
at the national or supranational (EU) level, the efforts at more extensive international 
harmonization have been few and are largely confined to Codex Alimentarius.  The 
Codex Commission has established guidelines for a limited number of defined categories 
of labeling including: 
 
 Nutrition Labeling;41 
 
 Organically produced foods;42 and 
 
 GMOs.43 
                                                 
38.  See ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations – Self-Declared Environmental Claims 
(Type II Environmental Labelling), ISO 14021.  See generally ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations 
– General Principles, ISO 14020. 
  
39 . See ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations – Type I Environmental Labelling – 
Principles and Procedures, ISO 14024. 
 
40.  See ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations – Type III Environmental Declarations – 
Principles and Procedures, ISO 14025. 
 
 41.  Guidelines on Nutrition Labelling, Codex Doc. CAC/GL 2-1985.  All Codex guidelines and 
standards related to food can be downloaded at <http://www.codexalimentarius.org/standards/list-of-
standards/>.  
 
 42.  Guidelines for the Production, Processing, Labelling and Marketing of Organically Produced 
Foods, Codex Doc. CAC/GL 32-1999. 
 
 43 .  Compilation of Codex texts relevant to the labeling of foods derived from modern 
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Because of Codex’s government-to-government multilateral character and the 
structure of the instruments, Codex guidelines, although non-binding, in effect replace 
unregulated Type II (unilateral) claims with governmentally-established standards.  The 
Codex guidelines may recommend mandatory labeling, as in the case of nutrition 
labeling, or voluntary labeling to governmentally-established requirements, as in the case 
of organically produced foods and GMOs. 
 
The Codex guidelines for organically produced foods are very detailed and 
address such issues as restrictions on use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers, absence of 
GMOs, prohibition of subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics and hormones for preventative 
purposes, and mandatory use of organic feed.  The Codex guidelines for labelling of 
GMOs, which were under consideration for two decades, have been particularly 
contentious because of opposition by the United States, which eventually agreed to 
guidelines recommending a voluntary as opposed to mandatory requirement.  
 
 B. Trade-Based Disciplines on Food Labeling 
 
All these claims related to some attribute of the foodstuff concerned, and are 
typically contained in a label.  The Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, 44  which in many respects is similar in structure to the Uruguay Round SPS 
Agreement, governs a wide variety of regulatory requirements that have environmental or 
public health implications, including specifications for consumer products and children’s 
toys, appliance efficiency criteria, and vehicle fuel efficiency standards.  The TBT 
Agreement specifically covers “packaging, marking or labelling requirements.”45 
 
Similar in structure to the WTO SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement requires the 
utilization of “relevant international standards” where they exist in promulgating 
governmentally–mandated regulatory requirements.46  “Standards,” as that term is used in 
the Agreement, includes voluntary guidelines adopted by an “international standardizing 
body,” 47  a term which encompasses both Codex Alimentarius 48  and ISO. 49   
                                                                                                                                                 
biotechnology, CAC/GL 76-2011. 
 
 44.  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (1995) 
[hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
 
 45.  Id. pmbl. para. 5 & Annex 1 paras. 1 & 2. 
 
46  Id. art. 2.4. 
 
47.  Id. Annex 1, para. 2.  According to the TBT Agreement, a “standard” is a 
[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method. 
Id. 
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Governmental regulations that conform to the standards adopted by such an international 
standardizing body are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of validity.50  To justify a 
departure from international standards, presumably because they are insufficiently 
rigorous, a WTO member would have to demonstrate that a harmonized international 
standard “would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the 
legitimate objectives pursued.”51 
 
The WTO jurisprudence interpreting article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement suggests 
that the threshold for justifying a departure from an international standard is high.  One of 
the first major disputes decided by the WTO Appellate Body concerned the labelling of 
sardines by the EU, which is the subject of a Codex Alimentarius standard.  Although the 
Appellate Body established that the burden is on the challenging party to demonstrate 
that the international standard is both effective and appropriate,52 the conclusion that the 
Codex standard met this standard turned upon the EU’s failure to establish facts related to 
consumers’ perceptions.53  
 
The Appellate Body has since addressed several disputes concerning labeling 
requirements established by the United States.  As in the sardines dispute against the EU, 
U.S. labeling schemes for tuna and meat were found to be inconsistent with the TBT 
Agreement, although for failure to satisfy the national treatment not because of 
departures from international standards.
54
   The Appellate Body’s report, reversing the 
panel’s findings on this issue, clarified and narrowed the scope of a "relevant 
international standard" within the meaning of article 2.4.  In particular, an international 
standardizing body must be open to the relevant body of every country.
55
  The Appellate 
                                                                                                                                                 
 48.  See European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 
2002) (requiring application of non-binding standard promulgated by Codex Alimentarius Commission) 
[hereinafter EC-Sardines]. 
 
49.  See United States -- Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/AB/R, AB-2012-2 (16 May 2012).  See TBT Agreement, supra note 
44, Annex 1 (expressly referencing “the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, General Terms and 
Their Definitions Concerning Standardization and Related Activities”). 
 
50.  TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.5. 
 
51  Id. art. 2.4.  
 
 52.  EC-Sardines, supra note 48, para. 287. 
 
 53.  Id. para. 290. 
 
 54.  United States -- Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/AB/R, AB-2012-2 (May 16, 2012) (violation of national treatment 
requirement in article 2.1 of TBT Agreement with respect to domestic requirements for labeling of tuna) 
[hereinafter Tuna II]; United States -- Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO 
Doc WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R, AB-2012-3 (June 29, 2012) (violation of national treatment 
requirement in article 2.1 of TBT Agreement with respect to domestic requirements for labeling of tuna).   
 
 55.   Tuna II, supra note 54, paras. 396-399.  
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Body also interpreted key terms in the TBT Agreement relating to international standards 
as used in article 2.4:  “international;”56 “recognized activities in standardization;”57 and 
“body” as used in the term “international standardizing body.”58 
 
Thanks to the structure of the TBT Agreement, those national regulatory 
requirements that are not based on the output, when it exists, of such a body are therefore 
particularly vulnerable to challenge as unnecessary obstacles to international trade. And 
the sorts of governmental requirements that are most likely to create impediments to 
international trade are those that are more rigorous than the international requirements, 
which may well be the product of a least-common-denominator consensus.  In a setting 
such as ISO, those standards originate from an industry-dominated forum. 
 
The result is that, through a trade agreement, the requirements of non-binding, 
hortatory guidance intended to establish minimum standards of good practice standards – 
a floor -- are transformed by the TBT Agreement into a legally binding outer limit of 
rigor—a ceiling.  Conversely, those national measures that conform to international 
standards are effectively insulated from challenge. Within the TBT Agreement, 
international standards may operate either as a sword—a negative standard used to 
challenge a domestic regulatory action, as in EC-Sardines —or a shield—an 
internationally agreed reference point that bolsters the legitimacy of a national measure.59 
 
As with sanitary and phytosanitary standards, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)60 and other regional and bilateral trade agreements to which the 
United States is party61 contain provisions disciplining technical barriers to trade, as does 
CETA.62  
 
The TTIP negotiations include a portion on technical barriers.  According to the 
EU’s official fact sheet63 it is seeking to: 
 
 be able to use international standards (such as those agreed in the International 
                                                 
 56.  Id. paras. 381-386. 
 
 57.  Id. paras. 387-394. 
 
 58.  Id. para. 359. 
 
 59.  See David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization:  Private Voluntary 
Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 79 (2009), updated and reprinted in Research 
Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO (Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost eds. 2013). 
 
 60.  Supra note 30, ch. 9 (technical barriers to trade).  
 
 61.  E.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
31, ch. 7 (technical barriers to trade).  
 
 62.  Supra note 15, ch. 6 (technical barriers to trade). 
 
 63.  <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153003.2%20TBTs.pdf >. 
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Organization for Standardization-ISO) to make it easier to export to the US; such 
standards are widely used in the EU and around the world[;] 
 
 eliminate or at least reduce unnecessarily duplicative or burdensome procedures for 
checking products[;] 
 
 ensure easy access to information on regulations and standards that apply to goods in the 
US and the EU[;] 
 
 improve cooperation between EU and US standardisation bodies when they draw up new 
standards; this will help reduce differences and they might even be able to agree on 
common standards[; and] 
 
 get more transparency in the US system on standards. 
 
The EU’s proposed negotiating text,64 would incorporate the WTO TBT Agreement 
by reference.  Specifically with respect to labeling, after reiterating the requirements of 
article 2.2 of the WTO TBT Agreement, the EU would add a new discipline: 
 
Compulsory marking requirements, while continuing to provide the necessary 
information to the user or consumer as well as to public authorities regarding compliance 
of products with specific requirements, should be limited as far as possible to what is 
essential and to what is the least trade restrictive to achieve the legitimate objective 
pursued.  
 
The U.S. for its part is seeking: 
 
to increase transparency and openness in the development of standards and technical 
regulations, ensure that U.S. bodies are permitted to test and certify products sold in 
Europe, promote EU recognition of international standards used to support global trade 
by U.S. exporters and producers, and establish an ongoing mechanism to discuss TBT 
concerns.
65
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As an aid in comparing and analyzing these three categories of regulatory 
provisions relating to food, it is useful clearly to summarize the sources of international 
requirements: 
  
                                                 
 64.  <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153025.pdf >. 
 
 65.  Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits In the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Detailed View, supra note 36.  
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 International 
Protections for 
National Measures 
 
Affirmative (Positive) 
Harmonization 
 
Trade-Based (Negative) 
Disciplines 
GIs TRIPS 
 
TTIP? 
No need – international 
protection for nationally-
established GIs in TRIPS 
None 
Food Safety 
Standards 
Not applicable Codex (non-binding) 
 
ISO (non-governmental, 
non-binding) 
 
Private certifying 
organizations 
WTO SPS Agreement 
 
TTIP SPS chapter 
Non-GI labeling of 
quality, sustainability, 
humane treatment, 
etc. 
Not applicable Codex (non-binding), but 
coverage very limited 
WTO TBT Agreement 
 
TTIP TBT chapter 
Figure 1.  Comparison of international legal standards for GIs, food safety standards, and 
non-GI claims of food quality 
 
This table is very revealing, in that it highlights one of the singular attributes of 
free trade agreements, namely their asymmetric character.  By and large, free trade 
agreements contain no minimum standards of performance in the fields of food safety, 
food quality, or in most other areas of social and regulatory policy.  Intellectual property 
is an important exception, in which unilateral, national measures are given international 
protection.  Consequently, GIs are structurally favored, as they fall within the IP regime. 
 
Returning to the examples at the beginning of this paper, the laboratory tests 
conducted on French wines detected  residues of an insecticide (bromopropylate) and a 
fungicide (carbendazim) prohibited in France [the EU?].  But according to a 
Parliamentary question, 66  there are no maximum residue limitations for pesticides in 
wine, in contrast to those for food and other beverages. 
 
Then there is M. Giboulot, who produces high-quality organic or “bio-dynamic” 
red and white wines from 35 acres of vines in Burgundy under the appellations “Côte de 
Beaune” and “Haute Côte de Nuits” and refused to spray his grapes with pesticides to 
fight flavescence dorée, a bacterial disease spread by the leaf hopper, Scaphoideus 
titanus.  Although his conviction was overturned, there is a serious question about the 
consistency of the strict requirements of GIs, which are protected at the international 
level, and organic standards, which are subject at the international level only to non-
binding affirmative harmonization in Codex. 
  
If either of these considerations – minimal food safety standards for residues of 
prohibited substances or internationally-agreed organic standards – were to be folded into 
                                                 
 66 .  <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2013-
011147&language=HU>. 
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the relevant GIs, the international situation would be entirely different.  In those 
situations, the relevant standards – food safety or organic, as the case may be – would be 
mandated as part of the GI requirements and then affirmatively protected through the 
TRIPS Agreement.  One could even imagine utilizing the theory of GIs for the benefit of 
food safety, quality, sustainability and the environment.  For instance, an “Appellation 
Nature Contrôlée” could be created for the promotion of organic wines.67 
 
In any event, this analysis demonstrates that the long-held view that free trade 
agreements like TTIP are incompatible with affirmative obligations with respect to food 
quality, food safety, the environment, and sustainability is simply incorrect.68  At the end 
of the day, GIs are simply a protected indication of quality -- and presumably high quality 
– and at an even more rudimentary level fundamentally the identification of the place of 
origin of a particular foodstuff. 
 
Although GIs are treated for trade purposes as having a proprietary component – 
hence the treatment as intellectual property – this is purely a legal construct designed to 
assure protections for particular interests and discrete social policy goals.  At present, 
trade agreements are deployed in exactly the opposite direction with respect to all other 
domestically-established standards for food.  The negative disciplines in the SPS and 
TBT Agreement exert downward pressure on excessively rigorous standards, which are 
entirely analogous to the high standards set by the protected regime of GIs.  It would be 
entirely possible to extend such an approach to regulation designed to address other 
attributes of food safety and quality, and those regulations could even be incorporated 
into the existing regime of geographical indications treated as intellectual property. 
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